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A B S T R A C T
There is over the last few years a clear trend in Europe to privatise traditional
govemmental tasks, also because of new EU legislation. Many  of these tasks
have traditionally been carried  out  by the govemment itself, largely because of
the ‘natura1 monopoly’ argument. Examples of current and future privatisation
polities  are the telecommunication and energy sector. For transport infrastruc-
ture (in this paper limited to roads and railways) however,  the picture is less
unambiguous, as in the past decade the govemments have even tended to
increase their influence, e.g., by formally taking over the financing  of infrastruc-
ture.
In this paper it is analyzed in how  far the traditional arguments for govemment
intervention are stil1 valid. First, the strategie  importante  of transport infrastruc-
ture is investigated by analyzing the resulting economie  impacts at several spatial
levels. Next, we investigate how  this affects the financing  and operation of
transport infrastructure  as a traditional govemment task, by applying inter  alia
the so-called Pentagon model and by employing the well-known  Coase-theorem.
In this context, the traditional arguments for govemment intervention and
possibilities for private operation and financing  of transport infrastructure  are
reviewed. It is concluded that the traditional arguments for government interven-
tion  have become less valid and that privatising transport infrastructure  may
improve the competitive  position of countries or regions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The influence of public policy on the society and the regional and national
economy  has drastically increased since 1945. As a result  govemment expendi-
tures have significantly risen  (absolutely and relatively), while also much  more
regulatory measures have been introduced. Social security systems were, for
example, largely expanded, while the government assumed inter  alia  respon-
sibility for the financing  and operation of transport infrastructure  (Nijkamp and
Rienstra, 1993).
In the 1980s however,  the societal and institutional environment in which
economie  agents were used to act changed  dramatically (Pokkema  and Nijkamp,
1994). This holds  for the public as wel1  as the private sector: the devolution
movement has induced an increased competition between companies  and
countries. As a result,  a rising need for restructuring and renewal has come to
the fore, and hence the Schumpeterian paradigm of ‘creative  destruction’ has
gained popularity. Even large companies  like IBM and Philips appear to face
problems when lags in renewal cause structural inefficiencies. The same may
hold for countries: the economie  development of most Western-European
countries for example lags behind that of the US and the Pacific, which may be
due to a more regulatory and conservative  institutional environment in Europe.
As
The response of successful companies  to this challenge has been diverse:
an increasing  emphasis on staling  up by fusions and take-overs (e.g., in the
financial  sector);
an aggressive market penetration (e.g., consumer  electronics);
‘back to basics’ strategies with repulsion of other activities (e.g., car industry,
micro-electronics);
emphasis on quality and flexibility (just  in time principles,  temporary con-
tracts  for employees);
developing national and intemational strategie  alliances, in order to secure
the competitive  position (car industry, chemical sector).
These trends are not only found in the private, but also in the public sector.
a result  much  more cooperation between countries seems to occur (EU,
NAFTA, ASEAN), several activities are repulsed (transport, telecommunication),
while unnecessary regulations are abolished (labour market, capital market). It
may be clear  that a good management in the public as wel1  as the private sector
may be of increasing importante  for the economie  development and welfare of
countries, regions and their citizens.
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Als0 in the transport sector - which is traditionally very  much  a regulated
sector - many  changes  occur nowadays. Traditionally , natura1 public monopolies
were thought to be the best market organisation. Nowadays, it is widely acknow-
ledged that incentives should be introduced  to make this sector more efficient
(see also Button and Pitfield, 1991).
In the 1980s the investments in infrastructure in many  EU commies
decreased largely , because of public budget problems and an increasing attention
for environmental impacts of transport (Bruinsma, 1994). The past few years the
attention for transport infrastructure has again increased, which may be a result
of the increasing congestion, while the attention for Trans-European Networks
has emerged because of the integration of the European Market (Nijkamp et al.,
1994).
As a result  it may be interesting to analyze  in how  far the above discussed
developments may influence the management of transport infrastructure and
whether it is possible to increase the influence of private parties in this sector.
We wil1  restrict ourselves to road and rail infrastructure, although the arguments
may also hold for other kinds of infrastructure (harbour, airports, telecommuni-
cation etc.).
The paper is built up as follows. First, in Section  2 the strategie  importante
is discussed  by assessing the economie  impacts of transport infrastructure and
identifying  trends in the use of governmental policy instruments.  In Section  3 the
traditional arguments for govemment influence are discussed.  Next, Section  4
focuses  on problems related to private financing  and operation of infrastructure
by analyzing transport infrastructure from the viewpoint of a ‘normal’  economie
good. In Section  5 we investigate how  private infrastructure provision may in
practice  be analyzed. Finally, some conclusions  are drawn in Section  6.
2 THE STRATEGIC IMFORTANCE OF TRANSPORT INF’RASTRUCTURE
2.1 Introduction
There is an increasing attention for transport infrastructure as a vehicle for
stimulating economie  growth and improving the competitiveness of countries or
regions. It is questionable whether such presuppositions are valid, however,  as
there may be contrasting developments. For example, interregional trade theory
claims that the construction of infrastructure has a clear positive impact at
several spatial scale levels (Bruinsma, 1994). Several costs for economie  fums
are reduced, because travel times are lower and become more reliable (which
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makes  e.g. just-in-time delivery possible). Therefore, production factors  may be
used more effkiently, which improves the competitiveness of companies. In this
way the construction of infrastructure may have a positive impact on a national
or regio&  economy.  On the other hand, it is wel1  possible that the improved
accessibility wil1  increase the competition from other regions or commies,  which
may then hamper  the expected economie  growth.
The final result  is unclear and therefore empirical research should offer
more insight into such impacts. To analyze  this question, we wil1  first  present a
concise overview of some case studies on the national, regional and urban level.
2.2 Empirical research
At the national leve1 several studies have been carried  out  on the impacts of
public investments in genera1 and of those in transport infrastructure in particu-
lar (see e.g., Aschauer, 1993; Bruinsma  and Rietveld, 1993; Seitz, 1993). It
appears that investments in several kinds of infrastructure - especially roads -
contribute  largely to economie  growth. This occurs by means  of increasing sales
of private companies; the impact on employment may be smaller however,  since
the productivity of labour also increases.
An important question in this respect is whether these impacts are tem-
porary or permanent. In the first  place,  construction of infrastructure only
stimulates economie  growth because of the multiplier effects of the construction
activities themselves. When  the project is finished,  the impacts are fading  away .
Secondly , better infrastructure and accessibility improve productivity , which wil1
stimulate economie  growth. As observed by Bruinsma  (1994),  some studies make
such a distinction between these impacts, but others don’t.
Transport infrastructure may not only be important for ~ti0~1,  but also for
regional economie  development. In empirical research positive economie  impacts
are often  found, especially on employment, the leve1 of investments and regional
economie  growth (see for an overview Bruinsma  and Rietveld, 1993). Other
studies however,  do not fmd significant impacts (see e.g.,Rienstra et al., 1994).
An important analytical distinction to be made is between generative and
distributive impacts. In the first  case there is clearly additional economie  growth
resulting from the construction of infrastructure, in the second  case there is only
a shift of economie  activities, while at a macro-leve1 there is no impact at ah. It
appears often  to be difficult to disentangle these impacts, because al1 may occur
at the same time.
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2.3 The  lncreaslng  importauce  of infrastructure
It may be clear that - especially at the national leve1 - generative impacts
occur, which emphasize  the importante  of transport infrastructure of a high
quality. This importante  is reinforced by some genera1 trends at the European
and global level.
First, because of the integration of e.g. the European markets  and the
liberalisation of global capita1 markets,  the attention for the competitive position
of distinct countries has increased. At the same time the possibilities for govern-
ments  to influence this  position have decreased, since the traditional policy
instruments  - adaptations of the exchange rate, monetary and budgetary pol-
icies - cannot be used because of the EMU-conditions and the liberalisation of
capita1 markets.  Therefore, the construction of infrastructure (not only transport,
but also e . g . telecommunication) is one of the few policy fields left in order to
influence the competitive position of a country. As a result,  many  commies
compete  with another to a larger extent, by improving the business climate via
tax cuts, subsidies and offering (semi-)public facilities.
Second,  there appears to be an increasing competition of ‘low wage coun-
tries’. Next to the competition of Pacific commies,  the competition of Eastem-
European and Nor&African commies  has dramatically increased. Therefore,
labour intensive production may be repulsed to these commies.  The only way for
high wage Western-European countries to curb this trend is to offer products
and services with a high quality and productivity. This increases the need for R
& D and a high education level, but also for high quality infrastructure.
As a result  there is not only an increasing emphasis on the quant@ of infra-
structure,  but also its quality . Examples are the ‘digital highway’ , the introduction
of mobile telephone networks, the construction of a HST network etc.
2.4 Success  factors  influencing  infmstructure
The quality of infrastructure may be analyzed by using the so-called Penta-
gon model, which contains  the five critical success factors  which contribute  to the
efficiency of an infiastructure  network (see also Nijkamp et al., 1994).
The hardware aims at the physical features of the infrastructure (terminals,
roads, railways, harbours). Software focuses  on the control  of it, for example by
introducing telematics systems to provide  information to users. There is a danger
that most attention will be paid to the hardware and software, while other
strategie  factors  may be largely forgotten. The model emphasizes however,  that
als0 a variety of other factors  are of major importante  for imposing the eco-
nomic  structure,  welfare and well-being of commies  and people.
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Figure I The  Pentagon model
As a result  also the orgware - the organisation and management - is of major
importante  for the efficiency of a country or region. However,  the construction
and use of infrastructure causes many  - especially negative - extemalities, like
noise, stench and visual annoyance or local and global air pollution. The govem-
ment and society have to make a trade-off therefore,  in which these negative
externalities  are weighed against the positive economie  impacts (ecoware). It
may be clear  however,  that a private delivery of physical transport infrastructure
may cause more problems than that of e.g. ,telecommunication.
Finally, the way new infrastructure is frnanced (fmware) is also an important
success  factor, which may be done entirely public, entirely private or by both
sectors (joint venture). In the next sections we wil1  analyze some strategie  policy
factors  which influence  the orgware and fmware of transport infrastructure,
especially when new infrastructure projects  are introduced.  We wil1  pay particu-
lar attention to possibilities for improving the overall effkiency by increasing
private sector involvement in the organisation and financing  of the infiastructure.
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3 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
3.1 Introduction
It is clear that there is - and should be - a large differente  in the financial
and socio-economie targets and democratie  responsibilities of the private and
public sector. As a result  there are several reasons for the govemment to
intervene in the economy  and to assume responsibility for the provision of
several goods. It may be clear that pure collective  goods (like defence) are
normally an exclusive  govemmental responsibility. When  the use of a good is
competitive however  (as is the case with infrastructure),  this good may in
principle  be provided by the private sector as well.
The question in how  far goods should be provided by the private sector may
be analyzed by using the transaction costs approach. Transaction costs include
those of e.g. negotiating, making  contracts,  control  and requiring information.
Within the Coase-theorem  of a world without transaction costs there is no
efficiency differente  between provision by either  the public or the private sector,
because negotiations continue until there is a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods
(Coase,  1988).
In reality however,  there are of course many  kinds of transaction costs. A
good should now be provided by that sector, which can offer it against the lowest
transaction costs. For normal  goods, provision by the private sector will be
optimal. For some goods however,  this may not be the case, which may justify
public intervention. In this respect it should be acknowledged, that also interven-
tion  causes costs - leading to so-called govemment failures -, which should be
weight against the resulting benefìts.
In order to analyze how  far govemment intervention is desired (in order to
correct a biased market allocation), we wil1  first  present a concise overview of
arguments to intervene, while next the concept of govemment faihues  wil1  be
elaborated.
3.2 VaIidity  of traditional  intervention arguments
There are several standard reasons for govemments to intervene in the
market. In light of the above mentioned trends in society, it is questionable
however,  whether these arguments are stil1  valid (Fokkema  and Nijkamp, 1994;
Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995).
First, there is the ‘infant industry’ and ‘infant region’ argument. Here it is
argued that in an initial stage of industrial or regional development the
economie  basis of a sector or region is too weak to be competitive and to
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survive, and therefore economie  actors should be protected temporarily. In
practice  however,  it appears that these measures are very  hard to abolish, while
these may lead to inefficiency and a Pareto-suboptimal allocation. Therefore,
there is nowadays more a trend to establish an attractive  general  business
climate, while - at least in Europe - protection also is decreased by European
legislation. Another argument is that in recent decades the accessibility of
peripheral regions has increased substantially by constructing new infrastructure
(Rienstra  et al., 1994),  which reduces the validity of the infant  region argument.
Second,  market failures may occur because a market system does not always
result  in a Pareto-optimal allocation. The aim of govemment intervention is then
to remedy this sub-optimal allocation and in this way to move towards the
theoretically optimal situation of perfect competition. There are several causes of
such market failures.
imperfect competition; infrastructure is an example of this situation, because
it is in most cases not efficient  to operate  two links on the same corridor.
Also the special network character of i&Wructure  causes imperfect
competition: one given link may contribute  to the profitability of other links,
and therefore an unprofitable link may be profitable when the impact on the
total network is taken into account. Often however,  there is competition with
other modes (while for highways also a high quality underlying road network
is available), which reduces the importante  of this argument.
imperfect information; this seems (besides telematics systems) to be of lesser
importante  in the case of infíastructure.
absente  of markets:  govemments intervene in transport to ehmi.nate negative
extemalities or to generate  positive extemalities as discussed  above. In
environmental and transport policy however,  there is a trend to cape  with
negative extemalities in a more market based way, e.g., by increasing fuel
costs  and introducing tolls or road-pricing systems. Such measures might also
be carried  out  by private instead of public companies  however,  since there is
in principle  a direct user charge for the operator of the infrastructure.
Finally, there is the ethics  and justice argument; an obvious example is the
provision of non-profitable public transport, because the government wants to
provide  a minimum mobility leve1 for everyone at reasonable fares. In this
respect, there is again a clear trend towards a market based provision, by using
franchising contracts  in order to link social polities  to efficiency incentives  (see
Section  5.2).
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It may be concluded that the necessity for govemments to intervene has
been reduced. As mentioned above, there is at the same time a growing aware-
ness of government failures, which wil1  be reviewed next.
3.3 Government  failures
When  the govemment intervenes in the market, the market mechanism wil1
(partly)  be replaced by a budget mechanism, which has its own rules.  These may
lead to a suboptimal (i.e., too high) leve1  of intervention, because of two
important reasons (Frey, 1983):
- civil servants have their own goals and utility functions;
- decision-making  is influenced by lobby and pressure groups.
These two arguments wil1  now briefly be discussed.  Civil servants may have a
utility function, which differs from the societal one; this may lead to a subopti-
mal allocation of funds. An example is the budget maximisation theory, which
takes for granted that the utility function of civil servants correlates  positively
with the public budget he has at his disposal. Since the civil servant has a
monopoly position in the provision of information to the parliament, he wil1
supply information with the intention that the intervention leve1 is higher  than in
the societal optimal situation. See for a graphical presentation Figure 2, in which
a simple situation is presented with linear  curves and without fixed costs. In this
figure the leve1 of intervention corresponds with the budget of the civil servant.
Figure  2 The intervention leve1  under  a budget maximising  civil servant
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When  the parliament would have full information, it would choose the
intervention leve1 at which the marginal costs would equal the marginal re-
venues, which corresponds with an intervention leve1 of i,, which is optimal. A
civil servant however,  may provide  only information about the total costs, and as
a result  the parliament may decide  to intervene at (somewhat lel?  of) the point
where  the average  total costs equal the average  total revenues, which corre-
sponds  with intervention leve1 i,. This is optimal for the civil servant since it
maximises his budget, but it is suboptimal from a societal point of view.
Also pressure groups may increase the leve1 of intervention. Groups in
society differ in power and strength: labour unions  and employer organisations
for example are wel1  organized, while consumers and tax payers do not have
poweríùl  pressure groups. By negotiating , the most powerful groups may gain
advantages at the expense of the less powerful ones. For each intervention
measure the costs per individual (consumer, tax payer) may be so low and
unclear, that it is not rational to resist the measure (like  minimum prices,
protection measures etc.).
Disadvantages of intervention in genera1 are that the market allocation is
disturbed, while a non-transparent and complicated legislation may be intro-
duced,  which may affect the possible allocation gains of public intervention. As a
result  the management of infrastructure  by the public sector leads by deftition
to efficiency losses. For transport infrastructure  this may have three major
impacts:
- the price  asked for using the infrastructure  may be too low, e.g., to satisfy
car users (which is a powerful pressure group) and to maximise  subsidies
(bu4vW  ;
inefficiencies in construction and maintenance of the infiastructure  may
emerge, because of lack of market incentives;
- construction of (unprofitable) infrastructure  may take place, in order to
satisfy pressure groups and to maximise  budgets.
It is clear  that a trade-off has to be made between the costs of govemment
intervention and the benefits because of the improved allocation, or - in Coasean
terms - between the transaction costs of market and public allocative  regimes.
When  the government decides  to intervene, this should be done in the most
efficient  way . It may be clear that in many  cases market-based intervention - in
which the private sector takes care of the provision - may lead to lower transac-
tion  costs than in case of public provision; in this  context, it should be acknow-
ledged that also equity considerations are important, however.
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In order to analyze  the extent to which private provision of infrastructure is
possible, we wil1  in the next section discuss  infrastructure  from a viewpoint of a
private investor .
4 INFRASTRUCTURE  AS A PRIVATEGOOD
4.1 Introduction
In the development and construction of infrastructure four stages may be
distinguished, which are important for investors. The first  is the R & D-stage, in
which the idea and the technical features of a project are developed. This stage
is followed by the financing  stage in which financiers  become interested, while
also the profitability of the project should be analyzed. The next stages are the
construction and exploitation stage.
The R & D-stage is mainly a technical one, in which the infrastructure is
developed, investigated and tested. It is important however,  that also economie
factors  like the market potential wil1  be considered. A political  decision has to
be made about the introduction as well. The outcome of this  stage is supposed
to be a given fact in the remaining part of this section. Most attention wil1  be
paid to the financing  stage, because this is the stage in which economie  possibi-
lities have to be analyzed.
4.2 The fiiancing  stage
Four important issues may be important in the financing  stage, which may to
a large extent influence the possibilities of a market provision; in principle  these
may hold for al1 investments. These are the characteristics of investments in
infrastructure, the risks involved, the expected costs and the expected revenues
of the project.
Characteristics  of investments in in.astructure
Most investment costs  of a project are noxmally  made when the infrastruc-
ture is constructed; the other costs (e.g., rolling stock) form a smaller part of the
total costs.  According to Emanuel (1991) the costs of a newly realised project
consist for about 80% of construction costs. For society, the infrastructure costs
are even more important, because the extemal costs of the construction and the
operation are mainly discussed  during the decision procedures about the
construction and site  of the infrastructure.
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Investments  in infrastructure may differ from competing investments such as
immovables and capital goods in several ways (Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995).
Especially the high investment costs and the long construction and planning
periods may make an investment very  unattractive for a private investor, because
in the beginning of a project a lot of capita1 is needed while the pay-back  period
is very long. As a result  the interest costs are very  high at the beginning of a
project, while the cash-flow and the return on investments are low. In most cases
there are no revenues  at al1 before the operation starts. When  it starts, the
profits tend to increase over time, because more repayments are made, which
reduce  the interest costs. The problem is that these high profits and revenues
often  start decades after the initial investment, which make the uncertainty and
the risks of infrastructure projects  very  high.
In practice however,  it is very  wel1  possible that there is no profit  at al1 (Nij-
kamp and Rienstra, 1995). The construction costs of infrastructure are (up to a
certain leve1  of demand/transport) fixed costs; the ether  costs are partly frxed
and partly variable. From this it fellows  that compared to competing investments
fuced costs in infrastructure are very  high for an investor, while variable and
marginal cor& are relatively low. When  the price  in this case is set according to
the marginal costs, it is often  not possible to make a satisfactory return on
investments.
An important factor is also the planning procedure. Often first  a politica1
decision is taken in which private financing  is already  assumed, and next a
private investor has to be found. This gives private investors a competitive
advantage in negotiations with public agencies.
Risks  of investments in infhstructure
Risks  are included  in al1 kinds of investments, but for investments in
infrastructure these are particularly high. This is the result  of the long pay-back
period, which makes  it difficult  to make good estimations.
The political  risks are the most important differente  compared to alternative
investments, however  (see also Section  4.4). In practice, govemments always wish
to influence the planning of infiastructure,  because of the important positive and
negative extemal effects and the national importante  of high quality infrastruc-
ture (see Section  2). There is always als0 a danger of changes  in laws or new
regulations or even nationalisation, since a change in transport policy may
influence the charges which can be asked as wel1  as the competition by other
modes.
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In conclusion, the risks  of infrastructure investments are very  high compared
to altemative investment opportunities; this in turn makes these investments
unattractive  for private investors, therefore a high risk compensation is needed.
In theory, this compensation should be given on the basis of high profit  expecta-
tions,  as can also be shown from recent tunnel projects in the Netherlands.
Another possibility however,  is that the govemment guarantees (part of) the
revenues  in one way or another, or makes the investment attractive  in a different
way (e . g . , tax exemption).
The  apected investment costs
The expected costs and revenues  are of course important for the calculation
of the return on investments. It appears to be very  difficult  to estimate the costs
of construction of major infrastructure projects, however.  These projects are
often  much  more expensive than estimated beforehand; well-known examples are
the Channel tunnel, High Speed Train-sections and the Betuwe freight railway
line in the Netherlands. This problem arises especially when the project is a
completely new transport mode or when new technologies  are used. Then many
costs are not known at the outset of the project and the estimates appear to be
too low in ahnost  al1 cases (Rienstra  et al., 1995).
Another important cause of rising costs are relatively expensive solutions,
chosen  to cape  with resistance in society, e.g., to avoid extemal effects (this may
lead e.g., to (half-)subterranean infrastructure and noise-shields). It is however
very  important that the tost  estimates are made on a reliable basis; otherwise it
wil1  be impossible to assess the economie  viability of the project. And if no
return on investment can be calculated, private investors might withdraw.
The  expected revenues
To calculate  the possible revenues  of a project several issues are noteworthy,
which are mainly important for the transport mode(s) which use(s)  the infia-
structure  at hand. First, an assessment of the market in which the mode wil1
operate  is important. Therefore, the (sub-)market(s) one is aiming  at should be
analyzed. These sub-markets can be distinguished according to the residential
zones of clients, their destinations, the reasons  for travelling etc. When,  for
instance, a project serves a mass transport mode, the price  must be low, while
the comfort, speed and service may be of lesser importante.  When  the project is
aiming  at the higher  leve1 business-market, the speed, reliability , service and
comfort are very important, while the price  may be set somewhat higher.  The
latter  is of course also dependent on the prices  of competing modes.
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Next, it is important to quant@ the sub-markets the mode is aiming  at. The
altematives for the traveller must be analyzed in light of the criteria which
determine the choice. When  this is known the mode may be constructed and
exploited in the most competitive  way. It is also important to consider the
changes that are expected in the sub-market(s) in the future. Several issues
regarding future transportation use may be distinguished (Nijkamp et al., 1994):
- demographic factors; for example declining population density in urban
areas, the age structure,  migration, labour participation, decline in working
hours etc. ;
- politica1 factors; for example, the European integration, the opening up of
new markets  in Eastem-Europe, the transport aim and environmental policy
of the government and/or  municipalities etc. ;
socio-economie factors; for example, economie  growth, growth of and
changes in trade flows, spread of production, the development of trade
blocks etc.;
- technical factors; for example, the emergence of new competing transport
modes, improvements  of existing modes and telecommunication etc.
When  this is analyzed, the number of travellers can be estimated. In this
case it is important to investigate  the uncertainty about these estimates, especial-
ly because these have to be made for the long term. It is especially crucial  to
analyze in how  far the demand  depends on characteristics of the infrastructure
(which may be influenced)  and on extemal factors (which cannot be influenced).
Next, the optimal price  can be set, eventually there may be price  differentiation
in one way or another, to reach different submarkets.
For total revenues  it may also be important to generate  other revenues  than
those which are directly related to transportation. Catering on longdistance
travelling and tax-free shopping  at airports are well-known  examples of indirect
revenues. But there may also be other possibilities. For example, railway stations
are popular sites for several companies  like bookshops, snackbars, flower shops,
travel agencies etc. Another  possibility for generating revenues  is a development
based on the value of the locations around transport terminals, which may arise
after  the construction of e.g. a new railway station. The question here is of
course whether it is possible for the investor to receive  (part of) these revenues.
When  al1 revenues  are known, the expected revenues  for the investor may be
calculated for the long run.
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4.3 The construction and  exploitation stage
When  the financiers of a project (private and/or  public) are identified and
the procedures are completed,  the construction of the project can start. It is in
this  stage very  important that the costs are kept under control,  because this
causes often  a lot of problems (e.g., the Channel tunnel). It appears that often
the costs of construction are higher  than expected, or certain financial  items have
been neglected. It is also important that the construction contracts  are clear
about who pays for excess costs; this often  leads to conflict&  which can also have
economie implications (e . g . , delays, higher  costs) .
Reducing annoyance to local people during  the construction is essential,
especially when the construction takes place in densely populated areas. When
the annoyance is high, the resistance in society against the construction wil1  be
high, which may cause delays.
When  the transport mode is relatively new, it wil1  have to work hard to get
its share of the transport market. In most cases new modes wil1  have to fmd a
new niche  in the market fust, while later they may also start to compete  with
existing transport modes. A good marketing strategy is very  important to get a
profitable market share. It is common practice  that ticket prices  have to be
relatively low at the beginning, in order to attract new travellers and to give
users of alternative modes an incentive to shift. Later on the charge may be
raised towards the economie  (or social) optimal level.
4.4 Current  trends and  lessons  from existing  projects
Since 1945 almost  al1 infrastructure  has been financed  and operated by
govemments or by public organisations tied to the govemment. Especially in the
case of railways, there is at present a trend to separate the financing  and
operation of infrastructure, as is the case in Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom  (Hannson  and Nillson, 1991; Nash, 1993). In this model, the manage-
ment and frnancing  of infrastructure  is the responsibility of the govemment,
while the operation takes place on a private basis, where  the operator imposes
user charges. In this situation there  may be several suppliers of transport
services, which allows competition. This model corresponds to recent EU-
regulations and is proposed or under discussion in several commies  (Germany,
Italy, Netherlands) .
Road (and waterway) infrastructure  is mostly the responsibility of the public
sector however,  although there are in several countries discussions about
introducing tol1  or road-pricing systems.
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It is noteworthy  that in recent years several projects have been financed  and
exploited (partly)  privately (Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1993). This concerns car
traffic projects, like tol1  roads (France, Italy) and several tunnels and bridges
(e.g., the Mont Blanc tunnel, Dutch tunnels, the Dartford  bridge), but also rail
projects like the TGV-Sud-Est and the Channel tunnel. Public  intervention in
these projects is stil1  relatively high, however.  Even the Channel tunnel, which is
said to be a private sector initiative, would not have been constructed without a
significant indirect support of the govemments concemed (Marcou,  1993).
Intercity rail traffic is in some countries profitable, and is therefore not
subsidised by the govemment (UK, Sweden, Switzerland). Local and regional
trafftc  are ahnost everywhere exploited at big losses. Regional rail traffic and
public road transport are subsidized in most European countries, as is the case
with local transport modes.
As discus&  above, it is very  important that traffic flows have a critical
mass, and hence projects which reduce  the importante  of barriers (borders and
natura1 barriers) are relatively often privately financed.
It should be added that in several cases the govemment appeared not always
to be a reliable partner. This may be an important failure  factor for future
projects, since this increases perceived politica1 risks. Examples are interventions
of the govemment after  the success of the Mont-Blanc-tunnel and the Cofi-route.
The govemment obliged here the investors to finance  new infrastructure  with the
profits they had made out  of these projects.
It may be concluded that there is a clear trend towards govemments
stepping  back and of an increasing influence  of the private sector in the ope-
ration  and financing  of transport infrastructure.
5 PRIVATE PROVISION IN PRACTICE
5.1 General  conditions
As discussed  above there is a clear privatisation trend in society. The ar-
guments  for govemment intervention have become less important, while any case
of public intervention is often  done in a market-based way. Therefore,
privatisation of infrastructure  may be an interesting option.
One of the arguments  against privatisation is that the govemment may
attract loans  at lower interest rates than the private sector; public financing  and
operation is cheaper because no risk premium is needed. There are however  two
reasons which may make this argument less vahd.
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First, this argument holds  for al1 investments, so that - when argued consist-
ently - the govemment should finance  or guarantee al1 investments. The reason
that this is not the case is - as a second  argument - that the private sector may
provide  the infrastructure in a cheaper way, which may compensate  the higher
interest costs. It is questionable of course, whether this also holds  for invest-
ments in transport i&astructure.
As argued in Nijkamp and Rienstra (1995),  two conditions have to be met
for private financing possibilities:
- the private investor should take the risks of the investment (at least to a
large extent);
- user charges should be levied.
The fust condition is, for example, not met when the govemment provides
guarantees for the pay-back  of loans. When  the govemment guarantees loans, it
runs the risks instead of the private investor, while possible additional revenues
are handed over to the private investor. In this way there are also less incentives
to provide  the infrastructure efficiently. In conclusion, such a model is not eco-
nomicly feasible and is therefore in the long run unattractive for govemments.
Next, levying user charges, e.g. by introducing tol1  or road pricing, is also a
necessary condition. An altemative is that the govemment compensates  the
investor from the public budget, e.g. by providing a revenue per passing car. In
this case however,  the govemment accepts long term obligations, while the
private investor wil1  ask a considerable  risk premium. Therefore, the costs for
the govemment wil1  be much higher  than with public financing, while the govem-
ment stil1 pays for the project out  of the public budget. From this argumentation,
it may be concluded that private financing  is only feasible when there are
considerable  revenues  from user charges. Private operation and management is
therefore a sine qua non for private financing, while this relationship does not
hold in the opposite direction.
Private financing constructions, which do not meet the above mentioned
conditions, are sometimes politically very  attractive  however,  because the funding
of the investment can be postponed, while the public control  over the infrastruc-
ture is not reduced.
5.2 Cooperation between the public and  private sector
It may be clear that in theory transport infrastructure may be provided by
the private sector. In practice  however,  the influence of govemments tends  to be
high, not only because of the strategie  importante  and the specific  characteristics
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of infrastructure, but also because of various environmental and equity  issues
involved. As a result,  private financing  and operation is in practice faces many
problems. Therefore, joint ventures may be an interesting option by combining
the advantages of both regimes. In such joint undertakings the above mentioned
conditions should of course be met, while market incentives should be intro-
duced  to a maximum extent in order to achieve  an efftcient  management and to
reduce  the transaction costs of infrastructure provision.
In many  cases private sector involvement tends  to be introduced by franchis-
ing (Andersen, 1993; Nash, 1993). A franchise can be defmed as a contract
between a transport authority (the franchiser) and a private company (the
franchisee),  by which the latter obtains the right to operate  a transport system.
Under a conventional franchise contract, the franchisee  pays the franchiser for
using his property rights. In the case of transport infrastructure, this situation
may be reversed: the transport authority may compensate  the private company
for an expected operational deficit. These franchise contracts  may be allocated
by means  of tendering. There may be two different kinds of contracts:  a given
transport system is transferred to the company which offers to operate  it at the
lowest costs or the contract is transferred to the company which offers the best
transport system for a given budget. The following management constructions
may be introduced (Gidman et al., 1995):
- affermage; the govemment controls  the formal regulations, but contracts  out
the operation (as is the case in some countries for rail infrastructure);
leasing the infrastructure; this may however  not meet the above discussed
conditions;
- build, own and operate  (BOO); in this model the private investor gets the
concession and wil1  become the legal owner of the infiastructure;
- build, operate  and transfer (BOT); this system is similar to BOO, but at the
end of a prespecified period the right to operate  the infrastructure is
transferred to a public authority; this is the option which is most often  used
in practice (e.g.,Dartford bridge, Channel tunnel).
6 CONCLUSIONS
The trends towards liberalising European and global markets,  as wel1  as the
reduced efftciency  of traditional policy instruments  have led to an increasing
attention for transport infrastructure. In this respect it is important that not only
the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ are considered as direct and clear success factors,
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but that also ‘orgware’, ‘fmware’ and to a lesser extent ‘ecoware’ are taken into
account. It should be acknowledged that the latter  three factors are also of
critical importante  for the economie  structure,  the welfare and well-being of
countries, regions and their citizens.
In orgware, current trends indicate  an increasing attention for market incen-
tives, in order to improve the competitive position vis à vis other countries, while
reasons for govemment intervention have become less valid. It is clear however,
that infrastructure - and the transport sector - cannot be left entirely to the
competente  of the private sector, because of the large number of extemalities
involved and because of equity reasons. Public intervention is therefore stil1
necessary, although a trade-off has to be made because of the high transaction
costs of intervention (govemment failures). When  the govemment decides  to
intervene, market-based measures may be most efficient,  which may not hamper
privatisation.
It is clear that privatising infrastructure - first  in the operation (orgware),
and second  also in financing  (fmware) - may lead to efficiency gains, while at the
same time other policy objectives  (environment, tax level, govemment deficits)
may be served.
In practice  however,  there are several problems which cal1 for a solution.
For example, it is important that the costs of constructing and exploitation of
infrastructure wil1  be wel1  estimated. In this respect, it is als0 important that the
calculations are consistent and do not underestimate real cos&  as is often  the
case. The same holds  for the expected use of infrastructure, since this is often
information which is not available for private investors. Besides direct revenues,
the generation of indirect revenues  might be important, in order to reach an
acceptable  return on investment.
To attract investors, the risks  have to be reduced to a maximum extent, with
taking into account the above discus&  factors. These risks  follow especially
from the long pay-back  period and the associated politica1 risks. Reducing these
risks  may be (partly)  a task of the govemment, however,  therefore joint ventures
may be attractive  too.
It may be concluded therefore, that several modes of privatising infrastruc-
ture may provoke various practica1 problems, but on the other hand a more
intensive involvement of the private sector may be essential for the enhancing
competitive position of countries, without having negative impacts on other
relevant policy objectives.
1 8
REFERENCES
Andersen, B., 1993, Franchising Altematives for European Transport, paper presented at the
Conference on the Evolution of Transport and Communication Networks in Europe, 14-
18 December, Padua.
Aschauer, D.A., 1993, Is Public Expenditure Productive ? , Journal of Monetary  Economics,
vol. 23, pp. 177-200.
Bruinsma, F.R., 1994, De Invloed van Transportinfiastructuur  op Ruimtelijke Patronen van
Economische Activiteiten, PhD-thesis, FEWEC, Free University, Amsterdam.
Bruinsma, F.R., and P. Rietveld, 1993, Infrastructure and Metropolitan Development; a
European Comparison, in: Leeuw, A. de, and H. Priemus (eds.), Bodenpolitik und
Infiastruktur,  Forschungen der Europäischen Fakultät für Bodenordnung, Strassburg,
Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main,  pp. 35-57.
Button, K., en D. Pitfïeld  (eds.), 1991, Transport Deregulation: an International Movement,
MacMillan Press, Basingstoke.
Coase,  R.H., 1988, The  Firm, the Market and the Law,  The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago/London.
Emanuel, J.D., 1991, Ultra Light Mass Transit; Today S Costs  and Environmental Break
through in Mass  Transit and People Movers.
Fokkema,  T., and P. Nijkamp, 1994, The Changing Role of Govemments: the End of
Planning History? , International Journal of Transport Economics, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
127-145.
Frey, B.S., 1983, Democratie  Economie  Policy: a Theoretical Introduction, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
’ Gidman, P., 1. Blore, J. Lorentzen and P. Schuttenbelt, 1995, Public-Private Partnerships  in
Urban Infrastructure Services, LI..-Working  Paper Series, no. 4, UNDP/UNCHS/World
Bank-UMP, Nairobi.
Hannson, L., and J.E. Nilsson, 1991, A New Swedish Railroad Policy: Separation of
Infiastructure  and Trafflc Production, Transportation Research, vol. 25A,  no.4, pp. 153-
1 5 9 .
Marcou, G., 1993, Public and Private Sectors in the Delivery of Public Infrastructure: the
Case of the Channel Tunnel from  an International Perspective, Environment and
Planning, vol. 11, pp. 1-18.
Nash,  C., 1993, Rail Privatisation in Britain, Journal of Transport Eízonomics  and Policy, vol.
27, no. 3, pp. 317-322.
Nijkamp, P., and S.A. Rienstra, 1993, Private Sector Involvement in Financing Transport
Infrastructure: a Historica1 Sketch, Cunent Practice  and Some Lessons, FEWEC-
Research Memorandum, no. 1993-67, Free University, Amsterdam.
Nijkamp, P., and S.A. Rienstra, 1995, Private Sector Involvement in Financing and Operating
Transport Infrastructure, Annals  of Regional Science (forthcoming).
Nijkamp, P., J.M. Vleugel, R. Maggi and 1. Masser,  1994, Missing Transport Networks  in
Europe, Avebury, Aldershot.
Rienstra, S.A., P. Rietveld, M.T.A. Hilferink and F.R. Bruinsma, 1994, Road Infrastructure
and Corridor Development, FEWEC-Research Memorandum, no. 1994-32, Free Univer-
sity, Amsterdam.
Rienstra, S.A., J.M. Vleugel and P. Nijkamp, 1995, Options  for Sustainable Passenger
Transport; an Assessment of Policy Choices, Transportation Planning and Technologv
(forthcoming).
Seitz, H., 1993, A Dual Economie  Analysis of the Benefits of the Public Road Network,
Annals  of Regional Science, vol. 27, pp. 223-239.
1 9
